Mental health disparities in solitary confinement by Simes, Jessica et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Sociology BU Open Access Articles
2020
Mental health disparities in solitary
confinement
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version First author draft












*Department of Sociology, 100 Cummington Mall, Boston MA 02215. E-mail:
simes@bu.edu. Thanks to Kendra Bradner and Samantha Plummer for their ex-
cellent research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the significant assistance
of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which provided access to admin-
istrative data used for the analysis. This research was supported by the Project
on Race, Class and Cumulative Adversity at Harvard University funded by the
Ford Foundation and the Hutchins Family Foundation, the Justice and Poverty
Project funded by the Ford Foundation, and National Science Foundation Grant
SES-1823846/1823854, and a grant from the Institute for Social and Economic
Research and Policy at Columbia University.
Abstract
Harsh prison conditions have been widely examined for their effects on the
mental health of incarcerated people. Few studies of punishment exam-
ine how mental health status could expose individuals to greater risk of
harsh and punitive treatment in the criminal justice system. With prisoners
confined to their cells for up to 23 hours each day, often deprived of visi-
tors or phone calls, solitary confinement is an important case for studying
both harsh treatment and cumulative disadvantage. Routinely used as pun-
ishment for prison misconduct, the quasi-legal process leading to solitary
confinement may be subject to the same forces that criminalize the men-
tally ill in community settings, and drive disparities in treatment. Analyzing
a large administrative dataset showing admissions to solitary confinement,
we find very high rates of punitive isolation among those with serious men-
tal illness that result from the cumulative effects of disciplinary tickets and
disciplinary hearings, in which long periods of solitary confinement are dis-
proportionately dispensed to the mentally ill. We estimate that prisoners
with serious mental illness could expect to spend three to four times longer
in solitary confinement than a similar person with no history of mental
illness. These findings suggest the stigma of dangerousness follows indi-
viduals into prison, providing new evidence of how the criminalization of
mental health conditions also accompany greater severity of incarceration.
Owing to stigma, behavioral risk factors, and cumulative disadvantage,
people with serious mental illness face greater risk of criminalization. How-
ever, mental illness is more often conceptualized as an outcome of harsh
conditions of the criminal justice system, rather than a potential risk factor
for criminalization. The mentally ill have been found to be arrested at high
rates in police encounters and engender fears of violence from respondents
in general population surveys (Teplin 1983; Phelan and Link 1998). While
racial and ethnic disparities at different stages of criminal justice process-
ing have been closely studied, disparities in exposure to harsh prison condi-
tions, particularly by health status, have received little systematic attention
(Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014, Chapter 6).
Solitary confinement is a vivid indicator of harsh U.S. prison conditions
and offers an important case for examining cumulative disadvantage and
the risk of exposure to harsh criminal justice outcomes. Markedly more se-
vere than norms established by the United Nations and other liberal democ-
racies, solitary confinement in the United States typically involves incarcer-
ating people in a prison cell for 23 hours each day, often for months at
a time, with strict limits on visits, phone calls, rehabilitative programing,
and physical activity (United Nations General Assembly 2011; Liman Pro-
gram & ASCA 2015). Under these conditions, solitary confinement has
been found to be psychologically painful, perhaps causing long-term dam-
age to mental health (Haney 2006; 2018; Grassian 2006). Exposure to
solitary confinement has been associated with reincarceration, poor labor
market outcomes, and elevated risks of mortality (Nguyen 2018; Brinkley-
Rubinstein et al. 2019; Wildeman and Anderson 2020). These effects are
felt broadly through the prison population. About 4 to 5% of people in
state prisons are estimated to be incarcerated in solitary confinement on
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any given day, and 20% of those in state prison report a period of solitary
confinement during their incarceration (Beck 2015).
This paper extends research on disparities in the criminal justice system
with an analysis of inequalities in the incidence and duration of solitary
confinement by mental health status in a large state prison system. We an-
alyze disparities in solitary confinement as a process of “criminalized cumu-
lative disadvantage.” Theories of stigma suggest the mentally ill confront
stereotypes of criminality and dangerousness that may affect the likelihood
of solitary confinement. Often in the analysis of criminal justice disparities,
criminal stigma is offered to explain biased decision-making by officials,
with the remaining disparity explained by offending behavior (Blumstein
1982; Tonry 1995, Chapter 2). However, empirical analysis often neglects
the process of criminalization of different social groups that is woven into
policy and practice, prior to the discretionary decisions by judges or offi-
cers. Tracing the sequence of stages leading to a criminal justice sanction
illuminates how and where disparities are institutionally produced.
Our empirical strategy examines mental health disparities in solitary
confinement with a large administrative dataset showing all prison admis-
sions and discharges from 2007 to 2016 in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has
the seventh largest state prison population in the country and is demo-
graphically similar to the national prison population (Carson 2016). We
use a novel mental health classification, rarely available to researchers,
where individuals are classified as belonging to one of four categories: (A)
No prior mental health history; (B) Prior diagnosis, but not currently in
treatment or taking medication; (C) In treatment or taking medication for
a mental health conditions; and (D) In treatment or taking medication for
a serious mental illness. The administrative data record all misconduct
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charges written by prison staff and all admissions to solitary confinement
that result from charges of prison misconduct. These data allow us to
model solitary confinement as a three-stage process: (1) receiving a mis-
conduct ticket, (2) being sent to solitary confinement after a misconduct
ticket was issued, and (3) the duration of solitary confinement. Control-
ling for charged offending in the community and in prison, risk assessment
scores, and prison facility fixed effects, we estimate disparities by mental
health status in the disciplinary process among people with similar histo-
ries, facing similar charges within the same prison. The three-stage analysis
can be decomposed to indicate which stage of the prison discipline process
contributes most to overall disparity. While we might expect misconduct
tickets to be disproportionately dispensed to those with mental illness due
to a combination of behavioral risk factors and stigma, little research indi-
cates whether the stigma of mental illness affects later stages of due process
and punishment after an incident of charged misconduct.
Our findings support the hypothesis that the stigmatization of people
classified as mentally ill impacts decisions at all stages of the criminal jus-
tice process. We find significant mental health disparities that result in very
high levels of solitary confinement among incarcerated men and women
with mental illness. Our findings suggest that mental illness is source of
stigma driving exposure to the harshest prison conditions, and provides ev-
idence that mental illness may expose people to greater and harsher crimi-
nalization.
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Research on the criminalization of mental illness burgeoned in the early
1970s with the widespread closure of psychiatric hospitals (Rothman 2002).
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In this context, people who were perceived as too dangerous for community-
based treatment were instead committed to prison, which became “the sys-
tem that can’t say no” (Teplin 1983, p. 55). The history of deinstitutional-
ization foreshadowed the current period in which “correctional facilities in
the United States” have become the “primary mental health institutions in
the nation” (Adams and Ferrandino 2008). By 2014, the number of men-
tally ill persons in prisons and jails was 10 times the number remaining in
state hospitals (Torrey et al. 2014).
Researchers have hypothesized that individuals with mental illness are
more likely than those with no diagnoses to receive harsh sanctions like
solitary confinement (National Academies of Sciences 2016; Cloud et al. 2015;
James and Glaze 2006; Haney 2003). Two main theories have offered ex-
planations for the overrepresentation of mentally ill people in the crimi-
nal justice system, and solitary confinement specifically. First, theories of
stigma propose that labels reinforce negative stereotypes, and when em-
ployed in power situations, allow stigma to take hold and impact individual
life chances (Goffman 1963; Link and Phelan 2001). Second, psychological
and criminological research links a propensity for violence to serious men-
tal illness (Douglas et al. 2009). We explore these theoretical perspectives,
and offer a theory of “criminalized cumulative disadvantage” to account for
disparities arising from a multistage process of punishment.
Mental Illness and the Stigma of Dangerousness
Stigma confers discredit, rendering people “bad, or dangerous, or weak”
in the eyes of their community (Goffman 1963, p. 3). Taken further, stig-
matized people are seen as “not quite human,” and subject to “varieties of
discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce
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[their] life chances” (Goffman 1963, p. 5). Link and Phelan (2001) specify
that we “apply the term stigma when elements of labeling, stereotyping,
separation, status loss, and discrimination co-occur in a power situation
that allows the components of stigma to unfold” (p. 367).
Individuals diagnosed with serious mental illness often bear a stigma of
dangerousness and the propensity for violent behavior (Teplin 1983; Dou-
glas et al. 2009). Vignette studies show that depression, substance use
disorder, and schizophrenia have been linked to perceived dangerousness
(Link et al. 1999). For many respondents in vignette studies, the “men-
tal patient” label activated stereotyped beliefs about the dangerousness of
people with mental illness (Link and Phelan 2001, p. 369). In a national
survey, four in ten Americans believed that children and adolescents with
depression were likely to be violent (Pescosolido 2013).
Researchers also report attributions of dangerousness to the mentally ill
in prisons. In a study of maximum-security prisons, Rhodes (2004, p. 105)
observed that “the most obvious cases of psychosis. . . represent a rupture
in the foundation of lawfulness on which an offender can be brought into
account.” In his review of institutional settings, Toch (1998) finds that
difficult behavior is regularly explained with a diagnosis of mental illness
that is often itself suffused with moral judgment. Psychopathy, for example,
designates individuals who “are presumptively sleazy, unsavory, repugnant
and dangerous” (Toch 1998, p. 151).
In our analysis, total institutions that manage stigmatized groups, such
as prisons, tend to reproduce stigma in their everyday operations. In a
context of intense power relations, the label of mental illness may lead to
stereotyping, discrimination, and segregation, and the process of prison
discipline reinforces the perceived criminality of stigmatized groups.
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Behavioral Risk and Mental Illness
Beyond the stigma of perceived dangerousness, mental illness can involve
illogical thinking, hallucinations, and mood swings that diminish the ca-
pacity to follow rules and disrupt the routinized life inside prisons. A
meta-analysis examining over 200 studies found psychosis was significantly
associated with a 49%–68% increase in the odds of violence (Douglas et
al. 2009). In prison, mental health crises may precipitate “throwing body
wastes or erupting in unpredictable displays of violence” (Rhodes 2004, p.
107). These behaviors can themselves be disturbing for other incarcerated
people, raising the likelihood of fights and other conflicts. Under these
conditions, incarcerated people with mental illness may be more likely to
be involved in conflicts that are subject to prison discipline. Thus, an as-
sociation between mental illness and solitary confinement could be in part
due to an increased risk of rule-breaking or violence. Here, mental illness
in prison has a twofold effect. First, incarcerated people who are mentally
ill may have trouble complying with prison rules. Authorities then impose
sanctions to try and manage this population in the prison. Second, where
mental illness is used by staff to explain behavioral problems, it is often
joined to character assessments (Adams and Ferrandino 2008, p. 916; Toch
1998). Attributions of dangerousness coupled with risks of disruptive be-
havior under the intense of authority relations of the prison subject the
mentally ill to elevated risks of prison discipline, and in particular, solitary
confinement.
Research also suggests that people with serious mental illness are at
high-risk of experiencing both criminal justice contact and violent victim-
ization. Brekke and colleagues (2001) find in a community-based study of
172 individuals with schizophrenia that while nearly half of their sample
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reported contact with police over a three-year period, respondents were 14
times more likely to be victims of a violent crime than to be arrested for
one. From this discussion of stigma and behavioral risk, we hypothesize
that individuals classified as having mental illness, particularly those with
serious mental illness, will be more likely than those with no diagnosis to
receive misconduct tickets.
Disparity, Cumulative Disadvantage, and Control Variables
The prior discussion follows from research on criminal justice disparities,
which often divides disproportionate punishment into “warranted” and “un-
warranted” components (e.g., Blumstein 1982; Spohn and Holleran 2000;
Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000). Warranted disparities refer to differen-
tial involvement in crime. The residual, unwarranted, disparities are inter-
preted as the result of bias in which people of color or the mentally ill, say,
are treated more harshly by authorities. A common empirical strategy uses
official measures of offending, such as arrest statistics, to identify the war-
ranted component of disparate punishment (Blumstein 1982; Tonry and
Melewski 2008). Researchers have widely observed, however, that enforce-
ment efforts like arrest are imperfect signals of offending because they may
also reflect differentiated treatment by authorities (e.g., Langan 1985).
However, even with perfect measures of crime, the distinction between
warranted and unwarranted disparities treats discretionary decision-making
as the sole source of disparity for which authorities are responsible. Policies
and routines of criminal justice agencies may punish some social contexts
or conduct more harshly than others. For example, a legal framework that
places few constraints on police discretion, or sentencing guidelines that
punish criminal history, each might foster disparities (Skogan and Frydl
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2004; Reiter 2015; Engel et al. 2019; Frase and Roberts 2019). Crimi-
nalization produced by the institutional context in which criminal justice
agencies operate are poorly described by a framework that focuses only
on decision-making by officials. However, institutional context is often
excluded from analysis because research is limited to a single stage of
the process of criminalization. Despite a wealth of research on inequality
and punishment, little scholarship provides an understanding of cumula-
tive disadvantage in the criminal justice system (Kurlychek and Johnson
2019). Thus, research on “disparity has typically been limited to a sin-
gle decision-making point. . .which captures only a static snapshot of the
more dynamic process that constitutes criminal punishment,” writes Spohn
(2015, p. 227).
To incorporate institutionalized disparities, we characterize criminal jus-
tice as a sequential process of cumulative disadvantage. From arrest, to
conviction, to sentencing, criminal processing involves discretionary decision-
making in a context of formal rules and routinized practices. Hagan (1974,
p. 379) describes this dynamic perspective, writing that disparities in law
enforcement and punishment are the products of how “transit through the
criminal justice system” operates “cumulatively to the disadvantage of mi-
nority group defendants.” Instead of dividing disparities into warranted
and unwarranted components, the sequential perspective on criminaliza-
tion and punishment aims to determine where disparities arise and how
they are amplified or attenuated with the institutional context.
Like other processes of punishment, discipline within prisons is shaped
by policy and marked by points of discretionary decision-making. Prison
discipline begins with correctional officers who write tickets for miscon-
duct. Misconduct charges may be referred to a disciplinary hearing, where
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a sanction of solitary confinement might be delivered by a hearing exam-
iner, similar to a sentencing judge in a criminal court. Correctional officers
have wide discretion in issuing tickets. In our sequential perspective on
prison discipline, misconduct charges can be seen not simply as reflecting
inmate behavior, but are the point in the disciplinary process in which the
scope for bias is widest. Hearing examiners are more constrained by due
process and prison regulations that specify the sanctions that can be issued.
In the final stage, determining the duration of solitary confinement, discre-
tion is constrained even further as sentences to solitary confinement are
prescribed by regulation depending on charge and misconduct history.
The institutionalized stages of prison discipline invites disparity in at
least two ways. First, discretion is built into the disciplinary process to
varying degrees at different stages. Second, an official history of miscon-
duct influences the severity of the sanction, and such a history may itself be
the product of prior biased discretion. We would expect to observe greatest
disparity in the earliest stages of the disciplinary process where discretion
is greatest. Because official misconduct history is weighed by the sanctions
scheme, disparity will likely be sustained in hearings that determine pun-
ishment and its severity.
In assessing disparity at each stage of prison discipline, what case char-
acteristics should be controlled? Controlling for behavior that affects soli-
tary confinement and is correlated with mental illness provides estimates
of differential treatment of cases that are observably similar in behavior. To
distinguish treatment by staff from prisoners’ behavior, researchers have
controlled for prior criminal record, the conviction offense, and demo-
graphic variables like age, race and ethnicity, marital status, and education.
Criminal history and the severity of the conviction offense, and youth, have
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all been widely found to be associated with prison misconduct and soli-
tary confinement (National Institute of Justice 2016, pp. 176–177; Steiner,
Butler, and Ellison 2014). Criminal history is often a factor weighed in sen-
tencing, and is a criterion in assessing length of stay in solitary confinement
in Pennsylvania. Controlling for criminal history thus yields a conservative
test of disparate treatment. Another set of hypotheses points to the envi-
ronment of prison management, that varies in its response to misconduct
and use of sanctions (DiIulio 1989; Sykes 1958).
Our analysis follows earlier research by controlling for conviction of-
fense and socioeconomic characteristics. We also control for the severity
of charged misconduct, risk assessment scores, and prison and year fixed
effects. Because some mental health differences in behavior may be unob-
served, the models do not provide sharp estimates of discrimination, de-
fined as differential treatment of otherwise identical cases. Instead, condi-
tioning on covariates yields empirical estimates of disparity among those
incarcerated at the same time and place, who present similar criminal
records and risk assessments. Comparing a baseline demographic model
to a full model with criminal history controls and fixed effects indicates
the magnitude of disparity related to observed behavior and institutional
environments.
DATA AND METHODS
We study mental health disparities in solitary confinement with prison records
on men and women incarcerated in Pennsylvania. The analysis relies on a
highly granular administrative dataset rarely available to researchers. The
rich and fine-grained data are leveraged to estimate disparities at each
stage of the process of solitary confinement, and the expected number of
10
days in solitary confinement for each person incarcerated in the prison sys-
tem.
Administrative Data on Solitary Confinement
Our data file includes records on all those who entered a Pennsylvania
prison facility between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2016, and pro-
vides information on incarceration for the admission cohort through March
1, 2018. We analyze data for 90,342 individuals who have complete records
for the regression variables (89% of the total recorded admissions).
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample. The key variable for
the analysis of disparities is mental health status. All those entering Penn-
sylvania prisons are given a mental health screening at intake and thus
predates any later experience of solitary confinement. The mental health
screening assigns all prison admissions to one of four categories: (1) no
prior diagnosis of mental illness, (2) a prior diagnosis but no current treat-
ment, (3) current treatment with medication or counseling for mental ill-
ness, and (4) current treatment for serious mental illness, or an intellectual
disability. Serious mental illness includes major depression, bipolar disor-
der, schizophrenia, or other psychotic disorders. Over half (51%) of men
have no prior history of mental illness compared to just 18% of women.
Over half (53%) of women admitted to prison have active diagnoses requir-
ing treatment for mental illness compared to 21% of men. About 11% of
women have been diagnosed with serious mental illness or an intellectual
disability. In contrast, only 2% of men have been diagnosed with serious
mental illness.
Similar to national figures, the Pennsylvania prison population is over
90% male, with a mean age of 33. Over half of those imprisoned in Penn-
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Table 1. Percentage distribution of mental health classification, demographic char-
acteristics, and criminal history, Pennsylvania prisoners, 2007–2016.
All Men Women
Mental Health Classification
No prior history 48.0 50.8 17.7
Prior diagnosis 25.6 26.3 18.5
In treatment: Mental illness 23.6 20.8 52.5
In treatment: Serious mental illness 2.8 2.1 11.3
Demographic Characteristics
White 46.0 43.7 69.4
Hispanic 11.0 11.4 6.4
Black 42.4 44.3 23.2
Other race .6 .6 1.0
Age (mean) 33.0 32.9 34.2
Unmarried 75.5 76.4 66.5
Married 14.2 14.1 15.0
Divorced 10.3 9.5 18.5
Risk Scores (Mean)
Recidivism risk score (0–11) 5.6 5.7 5.0
Substance use risk score (0–9) 3.9 3.9 4.7
Governing Offense
Drug 26.4 26.3 27.6
Property 17.1 16.3 26.2
Violent and sex 35.8 37.1 21.9
Other 20.7 20.3 24.3
N 90,342 82,463 7,879
sylvania are either black or Hispanic. Women in the admission cohort are
more likely to be white and nearly twice as likely as men to have been
divorced.
To account for the risk of prison misconduct, we control for risk assess-
ment scores and the governing offense. The first is intended to measure the
risk that a person will return to prison for committing a new crime or vio-
lating the conditions of their post-release supervision. The recidivism risk
score includes indicators of prior criminal and prison misconduct history,
12
age, and education level. On a scale from 0 to 11, the sample averages
a recidivism risk score of 5.6, with a slightly higher average for men than
women. The second scale is intended to measure the risk of relapse to sub-
stance use. On a scale from 0 to 9, the sample averages a score of 3.9,
with women scoring higher at 4.7. Similar to prior research, we also ac-
count for criminal history by controlling for governing offenses—the most
serious conviction for the current incarceration. Combining violent and
sex offenses accounts for 36% of governing offenses. Over one-quarter of
governing offenses are for drug-related crimes, and 17% are for property
crimes. The most common types of governing offense in the “other” cate-
gory were weapon or firearm charges.
Measuring the Process of Solitary Confinement
Misconduct charges. Our analysis considers only the punitive use of solitary
confinement that follows a charge of prison misconduct. (Solitary confine-
ment is also used administratively for self-protection and to separate those
whose conflict is seen as threatening prison security.) In cases of miscon-
duct, the pathway to solitary begins with a misconduct ticket, which often
lists several charges, parallel to charging by police officers in free society.
Charges include infractions that that are specific to the penal context and
violent violations that might be charged as criminal offenses outside prison.
In the ten-year observation period, 99,799 prison misconduct charges
were recorded on 47,344 tickets (Table 2). Nearly two-thirds of misconduct
tickets contained charges for defiance not associated with a violent act. Re-
fusing to participate in prison head counts (“failure to stand count”), lying,
and refusing to obey an order were the most common forms of defiance.
Only 14% of all misconduct tickets contained any charges of violence such
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Table 2. Percentage distribution of charges in prison misconduct tickets by gender
and mental health classification in Pennsylvania, 2007–2018.
Number of
Violence Drugs Defiance Tickets
All 13.6 23.2 60.0 47,344
Men 13.6 23.2 59.5 44,067
Mental Health Classification
No prior history 11.9 22.6 61.6 18,324
Prior diagnosis 13.7 23.9 58.9 12,794
In treatment: Mental illness 15.6 24.1 56.9 11,800
In treatment: Serious mental illness 18.5 16.7 60.0 1,149
Women 12.9 22.7 67.0 3,277
Mental Health Classification
No prior history 11.4 22.5 69.2 334
Prior diagnosis 9.9 24.4 68.1 574
In treatment: Mental illness 14.5 22.9 64.7 1,912
In treatment: Serious mental illness 11.2 20.4 73.3 457
Note: Misconduct tickets include up to 11 separate charges.
as fighting and assault. Moreover, misconduct varies by significantly mental
health status. Among men with serious mental illness, 18.5% of miscon-
duct tickets contain a violence charge compared to 11.9% for men without
mental illness. Women were more commonly charged with defiance than
were men.
Misconduct tickets, sanctions, and length of stay. Over a third of prison
terms contained at least one misconduct ticket event for those in the gen-
eral prison population (Table 3). Charges for misconduct were more com-
mon for the mentally ill. Between 35 and 44% of those with serious mental
illness were charged with misconduct, compared to 21 to 31% with no
history of diagnosed mental illness. Those with serious mental illness on
average received nearly .6 misconduct tickets a year, compared to an aver-
age of .4 misconducts a year for the whole sample.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for misconduct tickets and solitary confinement by
gender and mental health classification in Pennsylvania, 2007–2018.
Ever Issued Misconducts Solitary Given Median Days
Ticket (%) Per Year Misconduct (%) of Solitary
All (N = 90,342) 36.1 .41 48.6 31
Men (N = 82,463) 36.6 .41 49.0 31
Mental Health Classification
No prior history 31.3 .31 42.5 32
Prior diagnosis 38.8 .42 48.0 35
In treatment: Mental illness 45.0 .62 55.2 30
In treatment: Serious mental illness 44.2 .58 58.4 30
Women (N = 7,879) 30.3 .42 43.1 30
Mental Health Classification
No prior history 20.8 .22 36.2 32
Prior diagnosis 28.4 .32 35.3 30
In treatment: Mental illness 32.6 .48 43.8 30
In treatment: Serious mental illness 34.9 .60 50.1 35
Note: Column 1 indicates the percentage of prison terms where any misconduct
ticket was issued between 2007 and 2018. Column 2 indicates the average number
of misconduct tickets received per year in a given prison term. Column 3 reports
the percentage of misconduct tickets that receive the sanction of solitary confine-
ment. Column 4 displays the median days in solitary confinement conditional on
receiving a solitary sanction.
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Some misconduct charges lead to a disciplinary hearing where a hear-
ing examiner (similar to a judge in a criminal court) delivers a verdict and
decides on a sanction and its severity. There are a variety of possible sanc-
tions after a guilty verdict is decided, but nearly half of misconduct tickets
resulted in solitary confinement (49%). The rate of solitary confinement
sanctioning was highest for those classified at the highest level of mental
illness. The median length of stay in solitary confinement given misconduct
sanction was one month.
Analytic Strategy
Incarceration in solitary confinement for prison misconduct is a three-stage
process: a correctional officer charges a prisoner with misconduct and
writes a ticket for the charge; an examiner at a disciplinary hearing may
prescribe the sanction of solitary confinement; the examiner then assigns
the length of stay in solitary confinement. In a prison term, t , person i
may receive a number of misconduct tickets, and the expected count of the
number of tickets, λi t , can be written in a Poisson regression,
logλi t =α0 +α1m +x′i tα2, (1)
where α1m are the coefficients for a four-point mental health classifica-
tion (m = prior diagnosis, in treatment for mental illness, or in treatment
for serious mental illness, with no prior history in the reference category).
Covariates in the vector xi t include fixed effects for the year of prison ad-
mission, the prison facility, risk scores for recidivism and substance use,
demographics, and the governing offense severity. We also include an off-
set for the log length of stay in prison, so the coefficients describe effects of
covariates on misconduct tickets per year.
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For each misconduct, j , we have a binary variable that scores 1 for a
sanction of solitary confinement, and 0 otherwise. The second-stage anal-
ysis estimates the probability of being sent to solitary confinement given a






=β0 +β1m +x′i jβ2, (2)
where β1m are the mental health effects. Among the covariates in xi j we
also include a detailed set of dummy variables indicating if a ticket contains
a charge that requires a formal hearing (a measure of misconduct severity),
and the type of charge coded as separate categories for violence, threats,
defiance, or possession of drugs or other contraband, as well as risk scores,
demographics, and prison and year fixed effects.
Finally, each commitment to solitary confinement results in a length of
stay. The hearing examiner commonly sentences to solitary confinement
for 14, 30, or 60 days, but occasionally length of stay is reduced through a
review process or lengthened for later misconduct charges issued in solitary
confinement. Being a count of the number of days chosen by the hearing
examiner, we assume that length of stay follows a Poisson distribution:
logµi j = γ0 +γ1m +x′i jγ2, (3)
where µi j is the expected count of the number of days spent in solitary con-
finement. Covariates include all those used in equation (2) for the probabil-
ity of solitary confinement, plus a dummy variable indicating if additional
misconduct charges were issued while in solitary. (See Appendix Table A.1
for a complete list of covariates in equations 1–3.)
How should the coefficients for mental illness be interpreted? The co-
efficients are empirical estimates of differential involvement at each stage
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of the prison punishment process among incarcerated people with similar
histories, facing similar charges in the same admission cohort and prison.
The models imply that the expected annual length of stay in solitary con-
finement for a person with a given set of covariate characteristics, x̄, and
in a given mental health group is given by:
E(S|x̄) ≡ Ŝ = λ̂× p̂ × µ̂
where λ̂ is the predicted number of misconduct tickets in a prison spell, p̂ is
the predicted probability of solitary confinement given misconduct, and µ̂
is the predicted length of stay given a sanction of solitary confinement. By
accounting for the probability of solitary confinement, Ŝi is the marginal
length of stay expected for someone entering prison with covariate char-
acteristics, x̄. The marginal length of stay averages across all prisoners,
not just those who are sanctioned to solitary confinement. Standard errors
for the marginal length of stay can be simulated by calculating predicted
values from random draws from the normal distributions of the coefficient
estimates.
Finally, we decompose the total disparity in the marginal length of stay
into components related to disparities in the number of misconduct tickets,
the probability of solitary confinement, and the days in solitary confine-
ment given a misconduct ticket. For example, for mental health group m
(m = A,B ,C or D) for men and women, the expected number of days in
solitary, given covariate characteristics, can be written in the log scale:
log Ŝm = log p̂m + log λ̂m + log µ̂m .
Disparity between incarcerated people with no mental illness or serious
mental illness, for example, can be measured as the difference in the log
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expected number of days in solitary:
log ŜD − log Ŝ A = (log λ̂D − log λ̂A)+ (log p̂D − log p̂ A)+ (log µ̂D − log µ̂A).
On the natural scale, the disparity is the no diagnosis-serious mental illness
ratio and the disparity for each of the components contributes to the overall
disparity in days in solitary. The expected number of tickets, λ, probability
of solitary, p, and days in solitary, µ, can be calculated for men and women
with fixed characteristics, controlling for offense and misconduct histories.
RESULTS
Table 4 reports men’s regression results for each stage of the prison disci-
plinary process. Poisson regression estimates indicate large mental health
disparities in the annual number of misconduct tickets even when control-
ling for risk scores, the governing offense, and institutional and year effects
(Table 4, models 1 and 2). Men diagnosed with serious mental illness re-
ceive more than twice [exp(.863) = 2.37] as many misconduct tickets each
year than observably similar men with no diagnosis of mental illness.
Logistic regressions on the odds of solitary confinement at a disciplinary
hearing show that, consistent with the hypothesis of criminalized cumula-
tive disadvantage, mental health disparities at the hearing stage are large.
The odds of ending up in solitary confinement after receiving a misconduct
ticket are 50% higher for men receiving psychiatric treatment or with se-
rious mental illness compared to those without mental illness [exp(.395) =
1.48], even controlling for the type and severity of misconduct.
A final set of Poisson regressions analyze the number of days in solitary
confinement, conditional on being sanctioned to solitary confinement at a
disciplinary hearing (Table 4, models 5 and 6). Similar to the earlier stages
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Table 4. Regression analysis of misconduct tickets and solitary confinement for
men in Pennsylvania prisons, 2007–2018. (Absolute t statistics in parentheses.)
Misconduct Tickets Solitary Sanction Days of Solitary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -.801** -1.508** -.236** -1.132** 3.720** 3.895**
(46.91) (34.13) (10.57) (14.35) (149.61) (40.08)
Mental Health Classification
Prior diagnosis .425** .337** .207** .154** .048** .030
(32.09) (25.63) (12.04) (8.61) (2.65) (1.78)
In treatment: Mental illness .939** .813** .493** .395** -.002 .065**
(70.97) (60.78) (28.69) (21.90) (-.11) (3.69)
In treatment: Serious mental illness .927** .863** .615** .402** .246** .173**
(28.07) (26.42) (14.30) (8.48) (5.22) (3.96)
Controls:
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governing offense No Yes No Yes No Yes
Risk scores No Yes No Yes No Yes
Misconduct severity - - No Yes No Yes
Prison/year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R2 .127 .158 .009 .171 .240 .350
No. of individuals 82,812 82,812 38,931 38,931 26,572 26,572
No. of obs. 122,599 122,599 130,430 130,430 63,869 63,869
∗p < .05 ∗∗p < .01
Note: Misconduct severity includes a dummy if the ticket contains a charge that
requires a formal hearing, and dummy variables for charge categories (violence,
drugs, defiance, threats, contraband). Additional covariates results reported in
Appendix Table A.2.
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of prison discipline, the disparities are larger across mental health cate-
gories. Men with serious mental illness are locked in solitary confinement
for nearly 20% longer [exp(.173) = 1.19] than similar men with no history
of mental illness. At the median length of stay, men with serious mental
illness are estimated to spend an additional week in solitary confinement
compared to their counterparts who have no prior history of mental illness.
Poisson regression estimates indicate women classified as having serious
mental illness receive two and a half times more misconduct charges each
year [exp(.938) = 2.55] than similar women with no history of mental illness.
In logistic regression analyses predicting women’s odds of a solitary
sanction given a misconduct ticket, we find that women diagnosed with
serious mental illness have 47% [exp(.387) = 1.47] higher odds of receiv-
ing a solitary sanction, controlling for misconduct severity and type, risk
scores, and other offense and demographic characteristics. Estimates for
length of stay in solitary confinement suggest few significant differences by
mental health status.
Mental health disparities at each stage of the disciplinary process com-
bine to produce significant periods of solitary confinement incarceration
for people with mental illness. We calculate the marginal length of stay
in solitary confinement at the four levels of classified mental health status
for men and women with average covariate characteristics (Figure 1). The
lower panel of Figure 1 shows the relative numbers of all men and women
classified to each mental health category in prison. In the top panel, men
and women show a steep mental health gradient in solitary confinement in-
carceration. Men classified at the highest level of mental illness (C and D in
Figure 1) are expected to spend 22 to 26 days in solitary confinement each
year, compared to 8 days for men with no history of mental illness. The
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Table 5. Regression analysis of misconduct tickets and solitary confinement for
women in Pennsylvania prisons, 2007–2018. (Absolute t statistics in parentheses.)
Misconduct Tickets Solitary Sanction Days of Solitary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.149** -1.758** -.639** -1.894** 3.854** 3.887**
(12.71) (11.36) (5.56) (6.96) (30.66) (12.64)
Mental Health Classification
Prior diagnosis .463** .255** .016 -.103 .013 .018
(5.59) (3.23) (.14) (.86) (.10) (.14)
In treatment: Mental illness 1.079** .808** .386** .131 -.145 -.001
(15.02) (11.54) (4.20) (1.28) (1.37) (.01)
In treatment: Serious mental illness 1.367** .938** .636** .387** .041 -.012
(16.00) (10.97) (5.76) (3.21) (.34) (.11)
Controls:
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Governing offense No Yes No Yes No Yes
Risk scores No Yes No Yes No Yes
Misconduct severity - - No Yes No Yes
Prison/year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pseudo R2 .121 .207 .010 .184 .232 .347
No. of individuals 7,922 7,922 2,931 2,931 1,829 1,829
No. of obs. 11,032 11,032 9,270 9,270 3,993 3,993
∗p < .05 ∗∗p < .01
Note: Misconduct severity includes a dummy if the ticket contains a charge that
requires a formal hearing, and dummy variables for charge categories (violence,
drugs, defiance, threats, contraband). Additional covariates reported in Appendix
Table A.3.
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long marginal length of stay expected upon entering prison for men with
serious mental illness reflects the high probability of a solitary confinement
punishment, and the lengthy duration of solitary incarceration given the
punishment.
Women entering prison with current treatment needs or serious men-
tal illness are expected to spend between 18 and 23 days in solitary con-
finement, compared to 8 days for those with no mental illness. As for
the men, there are large differences in solitary confinement incarceration
among mental health classifications for women, and these differences re-
main even after controlling for detailed measures of criminal offense, mis-
conduct, and criminal or relapse risk.
Decomposing the disparities in solitary confinement by mental health
status reveals a stronger pattern of cumulative disadvantage (Table 6).
The largest differences between mental health classifications for men were
found between those with no history of mental illness and those receiv-
ing treatment for any mental illness. A man entering prison with serious
mental illness is expected to stay in solitary confinement more than four
times longer than a similar man with no history of mental health problems
[exp(1.44) = 4.22]. A woman with serious mental illness will stay in soli-
tary confinement more than three times longer [exp(1.31) = 3.71]. Between
60 and 70 percent of the difference in days of solitary confinement is re-
lated to the large number of misconduct tickets received by those classified
to the highest level of mental illness. Mental health disparity increases at
the following disciplinary stage. Roughly another 30 percent of the mental
health disparity is accrued at the disciplinary hearing, where those with
serious mental illness face high probabilities of being sanctioned to solitary
confinement.
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Figure 1. The lower panel of the figure shows the distribution of the prison popu-
lation by mental health classification for men and women. (A = no prior history
of mental illness; B = prior diagnosis; C = in treatment for mental illness; D = in
treatment for serious mental illness.) The top panel shows the estimated annual
rate of admission to solitary confinement for incarcerated men and women with
fixed covariate characteristics by mental health classification.
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Table 6. Decomposition of mental health disparity by the number of misconduct




of Logs Percentage of Logs Percentage
B to A Disparity
Tickets 0.34 64.66% 0.25 150.21%
Prob. of solitary 0.15 29.53 −0.10 −60.53
Days of solitary 0.03 5.80 0.02 10.31
Total 0.52 100.00 0.17 100.00
C to A Disparity
Tickets 0.81 63.89 0.81 86.20
Prob. of solitary 0.40 31.04 0.13 13.95
Days of solitary 0.06 5.07 0.00 −0.15
Total 1.27 100.00 0.94 100.00
D to A Disparity
Tickets 0.86 59.97 0.94 71.46
Prob. of solitary 0.40 27.97 0.39 29.46
Days of solitary 0.17 12.06 −0.01 −0.92
Total 1.44 100.00 1.31 100.00
Note: A = no prior history of mental illness; B = prior diagnosis; C = in treatment
for mental illness; D = in treatment for serious mental illness. Disparity is defined
as the difference in the log expected number of misconduct tickets, probability of
solitary confinement, and days of solitary confinement for a prisoner, aged 31 to
40, with average risk assessment and drug screen scores, median offense severity,
and mean level of misconduct in solitary confinement.
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DISCUSSION
High rates of incarceration and other criminal justice contact among the
mentally ill have been traced to stereotyped attributions of dangerousness
that distort the discretion of criminal justice officials. We extend this theory
to study the stages of prison discipline from misconduct charging to sen-
tencing to solitary confinement. In a criminal justice system characterized
by harsh policing, sentencing, and incarceration, we find that the sever-
ity of prison conditions is also intensified for the most vulnerable groups.
Criminal stigma that accompanies mental illness is associated with unusu-
ally harsh experiences of incarceration. The swift assessments made by
corrections officers to respond to the chaotic and sometimes violent condi-
tions of prison create opportunity for unchecked biases in an institutional
context that provides line officers with wide discretion.
We find evidence of large disparities in solitary confinement that pro-
duce lengthy periods of isolation for people with serious mental illness.
Controlling for crime and misconduct histories, the data indicate frequent
and lengthy periods of solitary confinement among those with serious men-
tal illness or who are otherwise receiving treatment. We estimate that the
modal male prisoner with serious mental illness could expect to spend four
times longer in solitary confinement than a similar man with no history of
mental illness. We estimated similar disparities for women. Disproportion-
ate solitary confinement among the mentally ill is mostly attributable to
misconduct ticketing in the general prison population. But reflecting a pro-
cess of criminalized cumulative disadvantage, disparity grows at the hear-
ing stage, where the mentally ill face a higher probability of solitary given
a misconduct charge than those without mental illness. Moreover, miscon-
duct most commonly involved charges of defiance to authority, rather than
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violent behavior. An important question for further research asks whether
the high rate of solitary confinement among people with mental illness
is chiefly a response to harmful conduct in the prison, or a management
tool for a behaviorally challenging population. Further analysis would re-
quire detailed data on the underlying incident for which misconduct was
charged.
One limitation of the current analysis is that behavior in prison is in-
completely observed. We assume that detailed measures of the governing
offense, misconduct severity, and risk scores are associated with behavioral
differences among prisoners. However, behavior in prison that does not
result in a misconduct charge is unobserved. Mental health differences in
the number of misconduct tickets, the largest component of disparity, may
reflect unmeasured behavioral differences. Despite the influence of unmea-
sured variables, the current analysis of cumulative criminalized disadvan-
tage highlights the leading importance of line officers at the first stage of
the prison disciplinary process.
A second limitation is that these results describe Pennsylvania state pris-
ons, but may not apply elsewhere. Additional data collection on the condi-
tions of prison confinement across jurisdictions and regions would provide
greater insight into the prevalence and disparities of solitary confinement
in the United States.
The current findings raise the urgent question of whether the mentally
ill are disproportionately incarcerated in solitary confinement in other ju-
risdictions. Although the effects of solitary confinement on mental health
have been studied closely, the question of whether and under what con-
ditions mental illness is a risk factor for solitary has not be systematically
examined. Previous research has shown how the stigma of criminality con-
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tributes to disparate involvement of the mentally ill in the criminal justice
system. The current results suggest that the stigma of criminality that at-
taches to mental illness also operates inside the prison to produce more
punishing conditions of imprisonment among those whose risks of incar-
ceration are highest. Common markers of criminal justice inequalities such
as health group ratios in incarceration rates thus underestimate the dispro-
portionate burden of incarceration on disadvantaged groups.
Finally, these findings raise important questions regarding the use of
solitary confinement within penal institutions and the long-term risks asso-
ciated with its practice. Despite a call for the absolute prohibition of solitary
confinement in excess of 15 days by the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture (United Nations General Assembly 2011), isolation as a punish-
ment in American prisons widely exceeds the 15-day standard to this day.
Indeed, our results show that the median period of solitary confinement is
double the upper limit set by the United Nations. Often analyzed in terms
of its effects on mental health, solitary confinement offers a case for exam-
ining the cumulative criminalization of mental illness across the stages of a
criminal justice process. Our evidence indicates that the harms of solitary
confinement are not distributed evenly across the prison population. In-
stead they are concentrated among those with mental illness. These results
point not only to the great scale of American penal confinement, but also
to its severity that heaps the harshest punishment on the most vulnerable.
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Table A.1. Covariates used in regression analyses of misconduct and solitary con-
finement.
Description Equation
Health and demographic covariates
Mental health classification Four mental health categories assigned at admission
to prison: (A) No diagnosis or history of mental ill-
ness or intellectual disability; (B) No treatment, but
some history of mental illness and no intellectual dis-
ability; (C) Receiving treatment for mental illness,
but no serious mental illness or intellectual disabil-
ity; (D) Receiving treatment for a serious mental ill-
ness or intellectual disability.
(1)(2)(3)
Race/ethnicity Four racial and ethnic categories: Black, Hispanic,
white, and other race/ethnicity (i.e. Asian, Native
American, other).
(1)(2)(3)
Age Five categories of age at first admission: 21 and un-
der, 22–25, 26–30, 31–40, Over 40.
(1)(2)(3)




Recidivism risk score Score (0–11) indicating a person’s risk of criminally
re-offending. The seven questions used in the risk
assessment include: person’s age at first arrest; cur-
rent age; prior adult convictions, prior sanctions for
institutional misconduct in prison, prior violations of
community supervision (e.g., probation or parole su-
pervision); less than 12th grade education; ever had
a drug problem. Score of 0–4 indicates low risk, 5–6
indicates medium risk, and 7–11 indicates high risk.
(1)(2)(3)
Substance use risk score Score (0–9) indicating the severity of substance use
disorder. The screening tool asks about substance
use type and frequency, and history of addiction and
treatment. A score of 2–3 indicates mild substance
use disorder, 4–5 indicates moderate disorder, and a
score of 6 or more indicates severe disorder.
(1)(2)(3)
Governing offense severity An ordinal variable of offenses described by the
Pennsylvania criminal code severity levels (1-15),
where 1 is the most severe (e.g. homicide), and 15
is the least severe (e.g. traffic violations).
(1)(2)(3)
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Description Equation
Misconduct severity A dummy variable indicating if a misconduct ticket
contains a charge that requires a formal hearing
(e.g., assault, rape, fighting, threatening another
person, possession or use of controlled substance).
(2)(3)
Misconduct type A set of five dummy variables indicating if the mis-
conduct ticket contains any charges of: violence,
drug use or possession, defiance, threats, or posses-
sion of contraband other than drugs.
(2)(3)
Misconduct in solitary A dummy variable indicating if additional miscon-




Prison fixed effects A dummy variable for the main prison of commit-
ment (27 dummy variables).
(1)(2)(3)
Year fixed effects A dummy variable for the year of the admission
(equation 1) or the year of the misconduct event
(equations 2 & 3).
(1)(2)(3)
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A.2. Regression coefficients for covariates in models of misconduct tickets and
solitary confinement for men in Pennsylvania prisons, 2007–2018. (Absolute t
statistics in parentheses.)
Misconduct Tickets Solitary Sanction Days of Solitary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black .455** .404** −.086** −.074** .052** .039*
(36.98) (30.28) (−5.36) (−4.08) (2.94) (2.23)
Hispanic .179** .177** .025 .011 .056* .029
(9.81) (9.54) (1.04) (.41) (2.27) (1.25)
Other race −.001 .054 .008 −.046 −.100 −.118
(.02) (.70) (.07) (.41) (1.62) (1.82)
Age 22–25 −.257** −.274** −.027 −.041* −.046* −.007
(16.24) (17.73) (1.35) (1.98) (2.13) (.31)
Age 26–30 −.539** −.521** .009 −.004 −.049* −.016
(33.33) (32.67) (.44) (.18) (2.12) (.74)
Age 31–39 −.865** −.837** .052* .031 −.065** −.042
(52.67) (51.26) (2.43) (1.31) (2.79) (1.83)
Over 40 −1.118** −.978** .019 .021 −.081** −.088**
(56.79) (49.17) (.75) (.75) (2.80) (3.04)
Married −.161** −.112** −.097** −.061* .029 −.002
(8.70) (6.22) (4.19) (2.49) (1.06) (.09)
Recidivism risk score .124** .029** .005
(37.67) (6.22) (1.09)
Substance use risk score −.015** .005* −.001
(7.63) (1.97) (.31)
∗p < .05 ∗∗p < .01
Note: Reference category for age is 21 and under. Covariates for governing offense
and misconduct severity, year and prison effects are suppressed.
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A.3. Regression coefficients for covariates in models of misconduct tickets and
solitary confinement for women in Pennsylvania prisons, 2007–2018. (Absolute t
statistics in parentheses.)
Misconduct Tickets Solitary Sanction Days of Solitary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black .720** .555** .210** .091 .022 −.013
(14.71) (10.51) (3.76) (1.47) (.33) (.22)
Hispanic .491** .457** .200* .098 −.252** −.211**
(6.08) (5.77) (2.32) (1.00) (2.74) (3.04)
Other race .643** .443* −.113 −.067 −.096 −.285*
(3.14) (1.99) (.42) (.29) (.75) (2.46)
Age 22–25 −.273** −.212** −.082 −.119 −.113 −.074
(3.56) (2.87) (.94) (1.37) (1.14) (.77)
Age 26–30 −.582** −.459** −.065 −.119 −.076 .007
(7.79) (6.21) (.76) (1.32) (.69) (.07)
Age 31–39 −.876** −.713** −.009 −.013 −.145 −.082
(11.28) (9.29) (.11) (.15) (1.46) (.88)
Over 40 −1.064** −.739** −.010 −.091 −.122 −.038
(12.29) (8.22) (1.07) (.92) (1.17) (.36)
Married −.113 −.065 −.116 −.127 −.086 −.082
(1.50) (.94) (1.41) (1.55) (1.02) (.95)
Recidivism risk score .167** −.001 .019
(10.53) (.05) (1.08)
Substance use risk score −.015* .019* −.015
(2.20) (2.23) (1.65)
∗p < .05 ∗∗p < .01
Note: Reference category for age is 21 and under. Covariates for governing offense
and misconduct severity, year and prison effects are suppressed.
36
